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In their Article Judicial Incentives and Indeterminacy in Sub-
stantive Review of Administrative Decisions,' Sidney A. Shapiro
and Richard E. Levy have raised in an intriguing way some panor-
amic questions about the role of judicial review in administrative
law. They offer both an ambitious theory of judicial behavior and
a proposed rewrite of section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
Act (APA),2 the scope of review section.
Tying these themes together is the authors' effort to under-
stand how the legal system can promote "determinacy" in judicial
review of agency actions. They argue that norms of "craft" (i.e.,
doctrinal rules) are always in tension with judges' desires to pro-
mote their preferred substantive outcomes, but that courts are par-
ticularly inclined to pursue the latter at the expense of the former
in administrative law. Because, in their view, courts are incapable
of establishing any consistent analytical framework for resolving
administrative law cases, Shapiro and Levy turn to Congress as the
best hope for instilling order in judicial review doctrine.
Despite my appreciation of their endeavor, however, I neither
favor the specific statute they offer3 nor believe that Congress
should be asked to consider any revision of section 706. The merit
of Shapiro and Levy's analysis, at least for me, is that it highlights
some lingering problems in scope of review doctrine and, just as
importantly, raises worthwhile questions about how much we really
want doctrine to control the outcome of appeals from administra-
tive decisions.
First, I examine the issue of how much clarity and predictabil-
ity we can fairly expect from scope of review doctrine. While this
entails scrutiny of Shapiro and Levy's interesting model of judicial
t Professor of Law, Washington University.
1. 44 DuKE LJ. 1049 (1995).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1988).
3. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1071-72.
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behavior, the points that I raise will be more normative than de-
scriptive in character. My doubts that "determinacy" is as desir-
able as Shapiro and Levy assume also lead me to disagree with
the authors' strategy of looking to Congress to improve the clarity
of scope of review doctrine. In Part II, I look more concretely at
Shapiro and Levy's proposed statute and highlight some difficulties
in drafting a comprehensive statute. I conclude with some remarks
about the potential role of scholarship in ameliorating the uncer-
tainties of scope of review doctrine.
I. THE QUEST FOR DETERMINACY
A. The Shapiro-Levy Model of Judicial Behavior
Shapiro and Levy seem frustrated that the Supreme Court's
opinions in Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc.4 and Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass'n v. State
Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co.5 have never dominated ju-
dicial review as they were "supposed" to.6 Their disappointment
that this has not occurred leads them to undertake an extended
exploration, using social choice theory, of the reasons why judges
do not always toe the lines that doctrine seems to dictate and why
courts often shy away from announcing restrictive "lines" in the
first place, especially in administrative law settings. The authors
posit three factors that motivate judges: "craft," which is defined
as "the well-reasoned application of doctrine"; "outcome," which is
"the result sought in the individual case"; and "leisure," which
roughly means the opportunity to go fishing instead of spending a
lot of time worrying about opinion-writing.7 The authors' "basic
contention is that a judge's outcome orientation is a function of
the determinacy of craft norms."' Thus, when rules of law are
phrased in a manner that gives definite direction to the courts,
judges are less likely to render result-oriented rulings because fla-
grant flouting of "craft" norms threatens them with reversal, dam-
age to their reputations, and other consequences that judges tend
to dislike.
4. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
5. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
6. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1049-50.
7. Id. at 1051-52.
8. Id. at 1056.
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I will not dwell on the specifics of this descriptive model
because the basic conclusion seems clearly correct. I will add only
a few comments.
In the first place, I see no inherent reason to associate "craft"
with administrative law and "outcome" with substantive law. For
judges who are ideologically attracted to the norms of administra-
tive law, craft and outcome motivations should converge; that is, if
a judge has an ideological commitment to "deference," she can
adhere to her idea of "craft" and take satisfaction in the "out-
come" at the same time.9 Conversely, once a principle of substan-
tive law has become established, a judicial devotee of "craft" will
presumably feel compelled to honor it, even if she disagrees with
it. It would seem, then, that "outcome orientation" should be
understood as a desire to pursue a result that would be inconsis-
tent with whatever result (or range of results) the applicable
"craft" principles would permit, whether the latter principles are
substantive or procedural. ° Shapiro and Levy can still argue, of
course, that the pursuit of "outcome" tends to diminish as the
specificity of craft norms increases; however, the multiplicity of
craft norms raises some questions about their normative analysis,
as we shall see.
Second, there is the empirical question of the strength of the
relationship that Shapiro and Levy posit. Law reviews have seen
much debate about the extent to which doctrine constrains judg-
es." As one who has spent much of an academic career writing
9. For an example of such commitment on the part of one jurist, see Laurence H.
Silberman, Chevron-The Intersection of Law & Policy, 58 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 821, 821
(1990) ("Those of us who have decried the extraordinary expansion of judicial power in
the latter half of this century might be thought to stand for a 'little judiciary' and...
we should bear the emblem proudly.").
10. Shapiro and Levy's distinction may be at its best in the context of agency adjudi-
cations. When a court reviews an agency's application of settled law to novel fact situa-
tions, it might well be meaningful to speak of the competing pulls of "craft" (the law)
and "outcome" (exceptional equities of an individual case). But rulemaking proceedings,
particularly ones that reach the Supreme Court, typically involve the reconciliation of
competing policies rooted in the underlying substantive law. These policies may well
embody craft norms that a court should bear in mind.
11. Compare, e.g., Harry T. Edwards, Public Misperceptions Concerning the "Politics"
of Judging: Dispelling Some Myths About the D.C. Circuit, 56 U. COLO. L. REV. 619, 620
(1985) ("[It is the law-and not the personal politics of individual judges-that controls
judicial decision-making in most cases resolved by the Court of Appeals.") and Alvin B.
Rubin, Doctrine in Decision-Making: Rationale or Rationalization, 1987 UTAH L. REV.
357, 357 (1987) ("My conclusions are that legal doctrine is a real force, that judges fol-
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about scope of review principles, 2 I prefer to believe that they
have at least some influence. Still, a simple sense of realism would
suggest that the extent to which scope of review principles actually
affect results is likely to depend in part on the kind of case in-
volved. Illustrative of one end of the spectrum is Rust v. Sulli-
van,"3 better known as the "gag rule" case. When the Court de-
cided Rust, there was probably no one in America who failed to
suspect that the Justices' (or at least some Justices') respective
views on abortion had more to do with their votes than did their
attitudes towards deference.
On the other hand, many cases do not involve such high
stakes and public passions. In those cases, it is much easier to
believe that judges are honestly willing to be guided by their un-
derstanding of scope of review principles. Occasionally, one ob-
serves a Justice stating that he is voting to uphold an agency's
interpretation but would have voted the other way had the
agency's view been different. 4 In cases like thIS, which typically
are obscure cases in which a judge might have no strong convic-
tions one way or the other, I should think only the diehard cynic
or legal realist would regard such statements as insincere."
low legal rules in deciding cases . . . .") with, e.g., Girardeau A. Spann, Simple Justice,
73 GEo. LJ. 1041, 1081 (1985) ("[J]udicial decisions are constrained only by the subjec-
tive preferences of the judges who issue them.").
12. See, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law,
74 MINN. L. REV. 689 (1990) [hereinafter Levin, Understanding Unreviewability]; Ronald
M. Levin, Scope-of-Review Doctrine Restated: An Administrative Law Section Report, 38
ADMIN. L. REv. 239 (1986) [hereinafter Levin, Restatement Report]; Ronald M. Levin,
Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review, and the Gloomy World of Judge Smith, 1986
DUIKE LJ. 258; Ronald M. Levin, Identifying Questions of Law in Administrative Law, 74
GEO. LJ. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Levin, Identifying Questions].
13. 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding, assertedly on the basis of Chevron, regulation
forbidding abortion counseling at federally funded clinics).
14. See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Public Employees' Relations Bd., 485 U.S.
589, 603-04 (1988) (White, J., concurring); Lukhard v. Reed, 481 U.S. 368, 383 (1987)
(Blackmun, J., concurring) ("I would base my vote to reverse . . . flatly, on the defer-
ence that is due the Secretary . . . ."); Pattern Makers' League v. NLRB, 473 U.S. 95,
117 (1985) (White, J., concurring).
15. Professor Schauer has similarly suggested that the Justices often use "plain mean-
ing" analysis of statutory questions in order to dispose of relatively uninteresting cases
without delving deeply into the underlying purposes of an enactment. Frederick Schauer,
Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 SuP. Cr.
REv. 231, 253-55. Unlike the principles of interpretation discussed by Schauer, however,
casual adherence to the principle of deference is not neutral between the parties in-
volved; it systematically favors the government. The practical lesson, of course, is that
private counsel have the de facto burden of making their case interesting and compelling
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Shapiro and Levy further argue that judges are especially
prone to adopt indeterminate craft norms in cases involving ad-
ministrative law. They cite two reasons for this tendency. First,
important public policies are more often at stake in these cases.16
Second, judges know that power shifts back and forth between the
major political parties over time; they are ambivalent about how
tightly to tie agencies' hands because they do not know whether
they will favor or oppose the causes that tomorrow's administra-
tors will pursue.1
Both of these arguments are open to question. The idea that
administrative law cases present more than their share of exciting
and passion-inspiring issues is not exactly self-evident. 8 Like cas-
es in other areas, regulatory cases are sometimes engaging and
glamorous, at other times, narrow and mundane. In fact, Shapiro
and Levy's argument seems seriously weakened by their own con-
cession that the "vast majority" of administrative law cases proba-
bly lack important public policy implications. 9 Nor is administra-
tive law litigation unique in regularly calling upon judges to enun-
ciate rules of law that may help their ideological soulmates today
but could easily hurt them tomorrow. Courts frequently encounter
a similar "veil of ignorance" in kindred procedural fields such as
civil procedure and remedies.
Despite these doubts, I agree with the general thrust of
Shapiro and Levy's position that pronouncements such as those in
enough to overcome an initial disposition to uphold the government.
16. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1061.
17. Id. at 1062.
18. Cf. Thomas M. Susman, Now More Than Ever: Reauthorizing the Administrative
Conference, Reforming Regulation, and Reinventing Government, 8 ADMIN. L. AM. U.
677, 682 (1994) ("Administrative procedure, simply stated, is not sexy stuff. It seldom
produces headline news or even spirited public debate. Administrative procedure is the
stuff of speeches that makes audiences doze."). I recall a workshop for administrative law
professors some years ago at which Professor Richard B. Stewart quipped that law school
courses in administrative law should be accorded some sort of handicap in the annual
student teaching evaluations. Most of the audience seemed to know what he meant.
19. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1061 n.39. It is no answer to say, as Shapiro
and Levy do, that there are important public policy considerations in a "significant por-
tion of high-profile cases, particularly those that make it to the Supreme Court." Id. The
issue is whether this holds true more often in administrative law than in other types of
law; I am skeptical about this point. Obviously, only the most important cases make it to
the Supreme Court, no matter what the field of law. Moreover, although the Supreme
Court receives only the tastiest morsels from the administrative law menu, that fare prob-
ably seems bland when compared with the rich diet of constitutional law cases on which
the Court regularly feeds.
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Chevron and State Farm are particularly susceptible to indetermi-
nacy. I would explain this tendency on the basis of factors that
relate to scope of review principles in particular, not to adminis-
trative law in general.
First, the great majority of cases in which a court might ad-
dress scope of review arise in a context in which the judges are
focusing primarily on the substantive issues in the case. Those
substantive issues will probably be the principal point in dispute
(or, in a Supreme Court case, the reason the Court granted re-
view). Thus, scope of review often enters the picture as an inci-
dental matter-one that the parties have scarcely addressed, if at
all. These circumstances alone may help explain why language in
judicial opinions purporting to state a standard of review is often
written without the kind of attention for which a purist might
hope.
Second, the incentives that normally induce the Court to write
its opinions carefully may be lower in scope of review contexts
than in others, because the Court decides some two dozen admin-
istrative cases every term. If today's draft opinion contains loose
language on standards of review, the Justices know they will have
a chance soon to counteract it. This inevitable multiplicity of pro-
nouncements removes some of the pressure on any given opinion
writer to worry about nuance, to reconcile seeming conflicts in
past dicta, and to expound scope of review principles in a com-
prehensive manner. Conversely, the Court has stronger incentives
to be precise in most substantive regulatory areas, because the
guidance presented in a single opinion may be all that the Court
will say on that particular subject for years to come. In short, the
Court's writing about scope of review can be seen as illustrating a
relationship that any economic modeler would find easy to under-
stand: talk is cheap when the supply of it is plentiful.
One can easily extend this last point to take into account the
relationships among the Justices. In opinion-writing generally, the
Justices tend to act as advocates, using their rhetorical skills to
make the strongest possible case for their side, often not shrinking
from a bit of hyperbole in the process. Tendencies toward exag-
geration are usually limited by the author's need to negotiate with
colleagues over the terms of the opinion. Where scope of review
language is concerned, however, the incentive for fellow Justices to
object to overstatements is relatively low, because, as just ex-
plained, each of them knows that any rhetorical excess will proba-
1086 [Vol. 44:1081
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bly be offset by countervailing rhetoric before the term ends. In
this context, it is not surprising that members of the Court stress
the importance of deference in cases in which they happen to be
upholding the agency's view. It is also not surprising that they
stress the importance of judicial checks on bureaucratic oppression
when they have decided to reject the agency's view. Who would
expect otherwise?'
B. Determinacy: Who Needs It?
Shapiro and Levy see a need to "reform" judicial review
doctrine in order to make craft norms as determinate as possible,
thereby minimizing the influence of "outcome orientation." No-
where, however, do they defend the desirability of their objective.
Determinacy is obviously somewhat desirable, but to what extent?
At what price? I will attempt to explore these questions here.
At the outset, it is helpful to recognize an ambiguity regard-
ing the extent to which Shapiro and Levy are seeking detenninacy
as opposed to deference. Portions of their argument carry at least
an implication that, in their view, courts are in general too intru-
sive in their scrutiny of administrative actions. Their abiding dis-
may at "outcome orientation" and their failure to condemn any
judicial decision for being too deferential reinforce the impression
that one of their principal concerns is "overly aggressive judicial
review."21 Yet they do not make a sustained case for increased
deference, and indeed one would expect some hesitation on this
score from authors who have previously been, and apparently
remain, advocates of "heightened scrutiny of the fourth branch"
through a vigorous application of State Farm.' They rest their
20. Similar reasoning may help to explain why statutory interpretation doctrine has
historically displayed the same kind of inconsistencies and vagueness that characterize
scope of review doctrine. This is another realm in which a plentiful supply of talk cheap-
ens the value of any particular pronouncement.
To be sure, Justices Scalia and Thomas have recently departed from the usual
mold by refusing on principle to join any opinion that relies significantly on legislative
history. The very fact that this is unusual-most Justices do not attach such importance
to method-gives these two Justices unusual bargaining power on this particular issue,
although presumably less on others. See Thomas W. Merrill, Textualism and the Future of
the Chevron Doctrine, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 351, 365-66 (1994). Deference, however, is
apparently a matter that most are willing to bargain about; it is a circumstance that
facilitates consensus but militates against clarity.
21. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1070.
22. See Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
10871995]
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program of reform primarily on a more abstract appeal to the
virtues of clarity and consistency, and I will respond to them on
that level.
One gathers that the authors' basic reason for pursuing deter-
minacy is a concern for legitimacy in the judicial review process.
Determinate standards of review, they suggest, deter judges from
deciding cases on the basis of personal value judgments and from
applying divergent modes of analysis to similar cases.' Thus, such
standards serve the rule of law. At a minimum, judicial review
standards can put pressure on courts to defend their (inevitably
value-influenced) positions on acceptable grounds. And perhaps,
once in a while, they do alter outcomes, and do so in a manner
that Shapiro and Levy's behavioral model aptly describes: a judge
might conclude that, given the applicable standard of review, re-
versal of an agency would simply not be credible (or not be credi-
ble enough to warrant the injury to his reputation and self-image
that would result from such "activism").24
Up to a point, this rationale for consistent, easy-to-apply
judicial review doctrines is obviously quite appealing. Additionally,
one could note the practical value of such doctrines for agencies
and members of the public, who benefit when they can plan their
primary conduct with some ability to predict what would happen if
a controversy were to end up in court.
The administrative law system has not, however, always as-
sumed that latitude for judicial creativity is altogether bad. Recall
the traditional perspective reflected in one of the greatest of the
Supreme Court's scope of review opinions, Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB:'
A formula for judicial review of administrative action may afford
grounds for certitude but cannot assure certainty of application.
Some scope for judicial discretion in applying the formula can be
avoided only by falsifying the actual process of judging or by
using the formula as an instrument of futile casuistry. It cannot
be too often repeated that judges are not automata.
Branck Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Deci-
sions, 1987 DUKE LJ. 387, 425.
23. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1056.
24. See iL at 1058.
25. 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
26. Id. at 488-89.
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Any suggestion that courts may properly keep an "outcome" ori-
entation in mind may seem to invite too lawless a role for the
judiciary, which should instead maintain its allegiance to "craft"
according to Shapiro and Levy's worldview. As I discussed earlier,
however, it is fallacious to align administrative law values exclu-
sively on the "craft" side of the divide and substantive concerns
entirely on the "outcome" side.' Judges, particularly at the Su-
preme Court level, often feel a responsibility to try to bring coher-
ence to the specific area of substantive law involved in a given
case.2 When a court strains the outer limits of the applicable
standards of review in order to pursue this objective, we teachers
of administrative law may condemn the court's decision as unprin-
cipled, but our colleagues down the hall who teach environmental
law, securities law, or labor law may praise the opinion as an
exemplary work of "craftsmanship."29
Furthermore, substantive judicial review is an inherently subtle
and complex subject. Often the situations that a proposed scope
principle must cover include highly formalized administrative set-
tings such as formal adjudications, high-stakes rulemaking pro-
27. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 502 U.S. 527 (1992) (rejecting agency interpre-
tation that the court found to be inconsistent with settled substantive law); Maislin Indus.,
U.S. v. Primary Steel, Inc. 497 U.S. 116 (1990) (same). Though probably stated too
strongly for modem sensibilities, Professor Jaffe's eloquent words remain perhaps the best
expression of this impulse:
An agency is not an island entire of itself. It is one of the many rooms in the
magnificent mansion of the law. The very subordination of the agency to judi-
cial jurisdiction is intended to proclaim the premise that each agency is to be
brought into harmony with the totality of the law; the law as it is found in the
statute at hand, the statute book at large, the principles and conceptions of the
"common law," and the ultimate guarantees associated with the Constitution.
Louis L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 590 (1965).
29. For example, the authors breezily dismiss NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S.
267 (1974), as a case in which the Court "did precisely what it reversed the circuit court
for doing in Hearst," i.e., manipulating standards of review in order to pursue a favored
outcome. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 22 n.67 (quoting RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR. ET
AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS § 7.4, at 349 (2d ed. 1992)). Yet the Court
found in Bell Aerospace that "the Board's early decisions, the purpose and legislative
history of the Taft-Hartley Act of 1947, the Board's subsequent and consistent con-
struction of the Act for more than two decades, and the decisions of the courts of ap-
peals" demonstrated that the Board had misread the Act in the decision under review.
416 U.S. at 289. Read at face value, this assertion would tend to indicate that Bell Aero-
space was a sterling example of the Court's devotion to "craft." I do not know whether
the Court's account of substantive law in this five-to-four ruling was accurate, but neither
do I see how anyone else could fairly assess the Court's "craftsmanship" except by mak-
ing a close study of the applicable legislation, precedents, and policies in labor law.
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ceedings, highly informal actions such as letters and press releases,
and mass-justice programs in which an agency has to move cases
quickly in order to stay on top of its workload. One can easily
imagine a court feeling daunted at the prospect of saying anything
that is supposed to be reliable in all of these situations.
Despite the structural obstacles analyzed in the preceding
section, I assume the Court frequently can, when it chooses, pre-
scribe a restrictive legal standard and make it stick." The equivo-
cation we see on scope of review may stem in part from inherent
tensions that the Justices think cannot easily be alleviated.
Ideologues at either end of the spectrum may subscribe to a "con-
sistent" view of deference, but jurists in the middle are likely to
take a less inflexible view. Perhaps their reluctance to try to settle
the law too quickly stems from proper judicial caution, including
an intuition that deference really ought to depend on context, i.e.,
that "it all depends."
In seeking the most promising opportunities for improvement
in the law on substantive judicial review, I would distinguish more
sharply than Shapiro and Levy do between two of the objectives
they espouse: curbing open-ended standards and curbing inconsis-
tencies in the courts' choices of standards." The latter involve
what Shapiro and Levy call categorization problems-disagree-
ments over what framework to use in a given case.32
Attempts to curtail vague categories, so as to bring about
"determinacy" of results, is subject to Justice Frankfurter's caution-
ary words in Universal Camera. Efforts to prescribe a widely ac-
ceptable framework for analysis that should be invoked in a given
context may often be more fruitful. Although the record of recent
years may not be as encouraging as one might desire, one can
plausibly hope that, with the aid of scholars like Shapiro and
Levy,33 the courts will eventually reach a greater degree of con-
30. I have previously contrasted the Court's treatment of Vermont Yankee Nuclear
Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978), and Heck-
ler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985), in this regard. In Vermont Yankee, the Court made
very clear its intention to curb judicial imposition of nonstatutory procedural requirements
in rulemaking, and lower courts have generally respected its stem admonition. In Chaney,
the Court showed less resolve in discouraging judicial review of enforcement discretion,
and lower courts have thus felt bolder about limiting the scope of the Court's holding.
See Levin, Understanding Unreviewability, supra note 12, at 778.
31. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1070.
32. Id.
33. See Levin, Identifying Questions, supra note 12, at 14-16, 62-63 (advocating schol-
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sensus on what questions to ask under certain circumstances during
substantive judicial review. This development would serve to re-
duce the influence of what Shapiro and Levy call "manipulable
categories. '
Yet even here I would offer a caveat. Whether to maintain a
particular set of categories should depend heavily on whether the
distinction underlying them is valid: Does the agency deserve def-
erence more in one case than in the other? An affirmative answer
constitutes a strong argument for preserving the distinction, even
though judges may have room to maneuver if the application of
the distinction is not self-evident. Sometimes our main concern is
that the law be "settled"; at other times we prefer that it be "set-
tled right." Therefore, at least until we have had enough experi-
ence with a given standard of review to say that it has proved its
worth in the precise form in which it is couched, courts should at
least be open to considering whether refiiements and exceptions
to it are warranted.35
C. Can Congress Do It Better?
So pessimistic are Shapiro and Levy about the chances that
the courts could straighten out the inconsistencies and vagueness
of scope of review doctrine that they wind up proposing legislative
action. Congress, they believe, should step in and impose standards
of review that would effectively prevent judges from imposing
their own value preferences on administrative action. Here I fear
the authors' commitment to "determinacy" has led them to en-
dorse a plan that could have far worse consequences than the
situation it seeks to cure.
arship to clarify standards of review).
34. The goals of curtailing vague standards and of avoiding categorization problems
are sometimes in tension. The very open-endedness of certain standards of review may
be part of what enables judges to agree to use them. For example, the meaning of "sub-
stantial evidence" has been fairly stable and satisfactory for several decades, as has the
meaning of the "clearly erroneous" test of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a). No
doubt part of the reason for the stability of these tests is that they are phrased at a high
level of generality that affords judges some room for ad hoc judgment.
35. To be sure, if our legal system is going to tolerate the Court's giving itself some
room to maneuver, other participants in the process, specifically lower courts and counsel,
must avoid taking the Court's pronouncements too seriously. That may be a difficult mes-
sage to offer to judges who properly recognize their duty to respect the teachings of
higher courts. Thoughtful judges recognize, however, that the Supreme Court speaks with
varying levels of seriousness and consistency on different occasions.
1995] 1091
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To imagine that Congress would take action anytime soon to
adopt the statute that Shapiro and Levy propose, one would have
to be able to envision Senator Robert Dole and Speaker Newt
Gingrich joining forces to support legislation that would protect
agencies run mostly by President Clinton's appointees from inter-
ference by judges appointed by Mr. Clinton's two Republican
predecessors. It is not exactly a surprise that the Contract With
America contained no provision of this kind.
Undoubtedly, Shapiro and Levy would reply to this flippant
put-down by saying that their proposal is only a preliminary sug-
gestion that addresses the indefinite future, not the immediate
present. I have, however, a serious reason for injecting a note of
realpolitik into the discussion. My real point is that if one's goal is
to promote coherence and an apolitical attitude in the judicial
review system, the congressional arena is an exceedingly poor
venue in which to seek a solution. The irony is that Shapiro and
Levy have constructed their article on the foundations of a "social
choice" theoretical model that, for analytical purposes, treats judg-
es as political strategizers. This style of analysis can sometimes
yield useful insights, but those who would look to Congress to
overcome the problems that such analysis uncovers should also be
wary of what real politicians might do with the same set of is-
sues.
36
Shapiro and Levy have either forgotten or chosen not to draw
lessons from the last time Congress took an active interest in
specifying the scope of judicial review of administrative action. The
initiative was known as the Bumpers Amendment after its chief
sponsor, Senator Dale Bumpers of Arkansas, and was in vogue in
the late 1970s and early 1980s. The Bumpers Amendment would
have added language to section 706 providing that "there shall be
no presumption that any rule or regulation of any agency is val-
id."'37 Indeed, the burden would have been on the agency to es-
36. Some of the early work by social choice theorists (sometimes called positive
political theorists) has treated judges as neutral, Olympian figures that can play a useful
role counteracting the self-interested tendencies of the legislative branch. This perspective
can be criticized for not taking into account the fact that judges, too, have political
agendas. See Daniel B. Rodriguez, The Positive Political Dimensions of Regulatory Re-
form, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 1, 33-34, 91 (1994) (noting the limitations of this perspective).
It seems considerably more curious to conceive of Congress, which by constitutional de-
sign is the branch that is closest to the people, as an appropriate entity to rein in judges
who might behave in an overly political fashion.
37. 125 CONG. REc. 23,478 (1979).
1092 [Vol. 44:1081
CERTAINTY ON APPEAL
tablish the validity of a challenged rule "by a preponderance of
the evidence shown. 38
That was a period in which the mood of the country was
deeply skeptical about government and in which there was broad
support in Congress for reducing the scope and influence of the
federal establishment. In short, it was quite similar to the domi-
nant spirit in Congress today. No wonder, then, that in the fall of
1979, when Senator Bumpers brought up his proposal as a floor
amendment to an unrelated bill, without any committee action, the
Senate passed it by a vote of 51-27.39
Some might think it unfair to take the Senate's impulsive
gesture as a measure of what Congress would do with judicial
review reform. After all, part of the Constitution's plan is that the
numerous hurdles of the bicameral legislative process are supposed
to induce deliberation and improvement of proposals that may be
crude or extreme at the outset. Indeed, as the "regulatory reform"
movement lurched forward over the next three years, the amend-
ment went through numerous revisions as part of the various re-
form bills.' Let us, therefore, flash forward to 1982 and look at
the Bumpers Amendment in its most sophisticated and refined
form-the version that was almost enacted.4 In its ultimate form,
the amendment would have added the word "independently" to
the opening sentence of section 706, so that the sentence would
have provided that the reviewing court shall "independently decide
all relevant questions of law."42 In addition, it would have added
language to section 706 requiring courts to resolve issues of "agen-
cy jurisdiction or authority on the basis of the language of the
38. Id.
39. Id. at 23,499 (vote rejecting motion to table).
40. For detailed accounts of the legislative history, see, e.g., Ronald M. Levin, Judi-
cial Review and the Bumpers Amendment, in 1979 ADMINISTRATIVE CONFERENCE OF THE
U.S., RECOMMENDATIONS & REPORTS 565, 566-70; Ronald M. Levin, Review of "Juris-
dictional" Issues Under the Bumpers Amendment, 1983 DUKE L. 355, 358-66 [hereinafter
Levin, Jurisdictional Issues]; James T. O'Reilly, Deference Makes a Difference: A Study of
Impacts of the Bumpers Judicial Review Amendment, 49 U. CIN. L. REV. 739, 747-67
(1980).
41. S. 1080, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. § 5 (1982). This bill passed the Senate by a 94-0
vote, cleared a House committee, and died only because of strenuous efforts by the
House Rules Committee during a lame duck session of Congress. See Prospects for Regu-
latory Reform Legislation, ADMIN. L. NEWs, Summer 1983, at 3.
42. 128 CONG. REC. 5,302 (1982).
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statute or, in the event of ambiguity, other evidence of ascertain-
able legislative intent., 43
To put it simply, the legislation would have encouraged courts
to use their own judgment on issues of law in administrative cases,
with little or no deference to what the agency might think. This
certainly would have alleviated the tension between "craft" and
"outcome" orientations: Congress would have totally eliminated
the influence of "craft" norms of deference as a brake on a
judge's pursuit of her favored "outcome" in the elaboration of
regulatory law. For issues of "jurisdiction or authority," the
amendment would have gone further and established what was
apparently intended as a sort of "reverse Chevron" principle: a
clear statement rule under which an agency's interpretation of its
jurisdiction would have had to be rejected in case of any ambigu-
ity.44
The implications of this episode seem clear: If one brought a
proposal like Shapiro and Levy's to Congress, one would have to
be prepared for that body to entertain amendments that would
conform with its own priorities and policy goals. The legislature is
well equipped to craft compromises that can attract broad political
support and capture the mood of the country; however, if one
wants coherence and detachment from momentary political agen-
das, the legislature may not be the right place to look.
Perhaps this assessment is too pessimistic. After all, Congress
did manage in 1946 to pass section 706 without attaching ideologi-
cal baggage, and many state legislatures have passed similarly
apolitical scope of review legislation since then. Indeed, we may
soon learn more about the legislature's capacity to enact coherent
scope of review principles. Even as this is written, Congress is
considering legislation on regulatory reform that would expressly
adopt a standard of judicial review for agency interpretations of
statutes in major rulemaking proceedings.45 No one can predict
43. Id.
44. That this was the intent of the "jurisdiction" provision is argued in Levin, Juris.
dictional Issues, supra note 40, at 358-70.
45. See S. 343, 104th Cong., 1st. Sess. (1995). Introduced by Senator Robert Dole,
this bill would call upon a reviewing court to determine, inter alia, whether an agency's
statutory interpretation "is clearly the interpretation of the statute intended by Congress"
when judged by "traditional principles of statutory construction" and whether the agency
"engaged in reasoned decisionmaking in determining that the [agency's] interpretation,
rather than other permissible constructions of the statute, is the one that maximizes net
benefits to society." Id. §§ 628(a), 628(c)(1)(C).
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the upshot of this legislative struggle. But given the intensity of
current debate inside and outside of Congress about the appro-
priate scope of regulation and of government itself, I would not
bet on seeing a dramatic step towards "determinacy."
In the end, however, Congress's guidance may matter less
than one would first expect. Shapiro and Levy's apparent assump-
tion that "judges would not be in a position to ignore" the legisla-
tion they propose' may underestimate the ingenuity of the
courts. After all, section 706 currently states that "the reviewing
court shall decide all relevant questions of law," but that language
has not prevented the Chevron doctrine from taking hold. On the
whole, indeed, the influence of section 706 on the development of
judicial review doctrine has been fairly meager. To Shapiro and
Levy, the courts' capacity to ignore what Congress says about
scope of review may be disconcerting; perhaps we should be com-
forted instead.
II. SHAPIRO AND LEVY'S PROPOSED STATUTE
Despite my doubts about the wisdom of turning to Congress
for repair of whatever weaknesses afflict modern scope of review
doctrine, I welcome Shapiro and Levy's suggested statute as a
contribution to the literature, because it furthers a necessary dia-
logue between commentators and the judiciary over the proper
standards for judicial review of administrative action. Indeed, the
authors graciously note that their suggested rewrite of section 706
is modeled in part on the "restatement of scope-of-review doc-
trine" adopted in 1986 by the American Bar Association's Section
of Administrative Law, a project for which I was the draftsman
Accordingly, in this section, I will put aside my differences with
Shapiro and Levy over the desirability of legislative action and
examine their proposal as, in effect, a heuristic device that may
cast light on the principles that courts should observe, regardless
of whether the principles ever appear in statutory form.
The format of a model statute is, in fact, a very good vehicle
for exploring standards of review. It can induce drafters and read-
ers to think about doctrine in a disciplined, concrete, and construc-
tive way. For example, the term of art "arbitrary and capricious"
46. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1073.
47. See Levin, Restatement Report, supra note 12.
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by itself conveys almost nothing;48 the statutory format is condu-
cive to an effort to state explicitly what specific errors would vio-
late that criterion. Moreover, the format draws attention to the
important problem of integrating prevailing standards of review
into a coherent whole. Shapiro and Levy seem particularly inter-
ested in this last problem.49 They have made an articulate case
for their proposal, but several cautionary observations seem worth
making.
First, part of the authors' strategy in their statute 0 is to re-
state existing law in a relatively "determinate" fashion so that
courts cannot misunderstand their mandate. It is at least open to
question, however, whether Shapiro and Levy have succeeded in
offering language that would actually clarify the law. Thus, in
subsection (C), the authors' use of epithets such as "specifically
resolved," "unmistakable," and "unequivocally" might very well
make the standard of review for issues of law narrower than cur-
rent law, but I am by no means convinced that these terms would
make the law less vague. Similarly, in their "abuse of discretion"
subsections, Shapiro and Levy use unfamiliar phrases like "logical-
ly coherent explanation" and "valid policy explanation," which
they themselves presumably understand, but which have no estab-
lished caselaw gloss and might very well cause deep puzzlement
for judges. In Universal Camera51 Justice Frankfurter anticipated
48. See William H. Allen, Chairman's Message, 35 ADMIN. L. REV. iii, vi (Spring
1983).
49. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1073.
50. The "key provisions" of the proposed statute, id. at 1072, would direct courts to
set aside an agency action if
(C) the agency decision violates its statutory mandate or other statutory pro-
visions because:
(1) the issue has been specifically resolved by explicit statutory language;
(2) the issue has been specifically resolved by legislative history manifest-
ing an unmistakable congressional intent; or
(3) a contrary interpretation of the statute is unequivocally required by
the traditional tools of statutory construction; or
(D) the agency has not offered a valid policy explanation for its decision be-
cause:
(1) it relied on policy concerns that were precluded by statute; or
(2) entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem; or
(E) the agency has not offered a logically coherent explanation in terms of
agency expertise, credibility determinations, or policy considerations, of
(1) why the evidence in the record supports its decision; or
(2) why the contrary evidence does not preclude the decision.
51. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951).
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perfectly the difficulty faced by the authors: "Since the precise way
in which courts interfere with agency findings cannot be impris-
oned within any form of words, new formulas attempting to re-
phrase the old are not likely to be more helpful than the old.
There are no talismanic words that can avoid the process of judg-
ment."' Nevertheless, to the extent that Shapiro and Levy's real
objective is to dampen what they call "overly aggressive judicial
review,"53 it is fair to assume that their newly framed terms might
do the job more effectively than current formulas do.
Second, the proposed statute seems less successful in terms of
the authors' aspiration to curb what they call "manipulable catego-
ries to which different degrees of deference apply."' 4 Specifically,
they criticize current scope of review doctrine on the ground that
courts can pursue personal agendas by alternatively choosing to
decide a case under the deferential Chevron standard or the State
Farm "hard look" standard 5 Therefore they intend to "clarify
the relationship between Chevron and State Farm as part of a
single inquiry." 6 Surprisingly, their statute leaves room for exactly
the same maneuver. Apparently, a court could invalidate an agen-
cy action for "rely[ing] on policy concerns that were precluded by
statute" under subsection (D)(1), even if the alleged misreading of
the statute were not "explicit," "unmistakable," or "unequivocal"
within the meaning of subsection (C). 7
Of course, Shapiro and Levy could head off this tactic by
making clear that subsection (D) reversals would have to meet the
same rigorous standards as in subsection (C), but then they would
need to explain why they have included two subsections in the
first place. Part of the problem here is that the authors have too
uncritically committed themselves to the four-factor formula of
State Farm instead of recognizing that the Court's test in that case
is framed in a confusing manner. One factor that can make a rule
arbitrary, according to State Farm, is that "the agency has relied
on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider."" The
52. Id. at 489.
53. Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1070.
54. Id. at 1062.
55. See id. at 1063-66 & n.55.
56. Id. at 1073-74.
57. The same maneuver might be possible under subsection (D)(2), depending on
how that provision is construed. See infra note 63.
58. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43
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Court should never have characterized this issue as part of abuse
of discretion review. To do so "create[s] an overlap between arbi-
trariness review and the legal question of whether the agency
acted beyond its legal authority-a question that the court logically
should confront before reaching the issue of arbitrariness."59
Third, the proposed statute revives the questions I broached
earlier as to how much we should pursue "determinacy" as op-
posed to other values. For example, the acceptability of subsection
(C), Shapiro and Levy's version of step one of the Chevron test,'
would seem to depend directly on one's attitude towards the sub-
stance of the Chevron standard. I will not discuss the merits of
that issue here, because Shapiro and Levy themselves do not ad-
dress it. My point is simply that unless one is prepared to take a
stand on the relative authority and competence of courts and
agencies in the interpretation of statutes, one cannot meaningfully
decide whether the manner in which Shapiro and Levy have struck
the balance between agency autonomy and judicial control is at-
tractive. The goal of "determinacy" should not resolve the issue by
itself. Similarly, subsection (C) would adopt a particular position
on the relative weight of text, legislative intent, and "traditional
tools of construction" in the interpretation of statutes; yet this is a
position that demands a substantive analysis, not just an appeal to
consistency for the sake of consistency."
Fourth, in an attempt to simplify "abuse of discretion" review,
Shapiro and Levy's proposed statute would go even further and
would entirely wipe out several established and familiar inquiries
that courts have commonly used in deciding whether an agency
action is "arbitrary and capricious." Some of these inquiries may
have been omitted simply because the authors failed to think
about them. For example, their proposed statute appears to con-
tain no language that would authorize a reviewing court to set
(1983).
59. ERNEST GELLHORN & RONALD M. LEVIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS
IN A NUTSHELL 98 (3d ed. 1990).
60. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837,
842 (1984).
61. Even assuming that it is realistic for the authors to propose that Congress pass a
statute purporting to settle the debate over the relative authority of text, legislative histo-
ry, and canons in the construction of statutes, I have to wonder whether it would make
sense for a legislature to codify a philosophy of statutory interpretation for administrative
law cases alone, leaving uncodified the ground rules for resolving every other type of
statutory dispute.
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aside an agency action that violates the agency's own regulations.
The proposition that an agency is bound by its own rules (or at
least its "legislative" rules) is both fundamental and uncontrover-
sial, and it is difficult to believe that Shapiro and Levy would seek
to abolish it.62 Similarly, the proposed statute cannot readily be
construed to allow a court to strike down an action because the
agency acted inconsistently with its own prior positions or prece-
dents and failed to explain why.' This omission is curious be-
cause State Farm itself largely turned on this principle.'
Other omissions, however, appear to be quite deliberate. For
example, to judge from the most natural reading of subsection (E),
Shapiro and Levy propose to strip courts of their power to hold
that an agency action is invalid because the agency has drawn a
factual conclusion that no reasonable person could have reached
on the basis of the evidence in the record. In other words, the
court would apparently have to uphold the challenged action if the
agency's explanation for its factual perceptions is "logically coher-
ent" (a phrase that would seem to denote mere intelligibility),
62. A purist might argue that an agency that violates its own regulation has not
"abused its discretion," but rather has taken an action with respect to which it had no
discretion (just as if it had violated a statute). Indeed, the ABA restatement followed
this analysis. See Levin, Restatement Report, supra note 12, at 248. On the other hand,
the only language in the current APA that supports the doctrine is in the so-called abuse
of discretion clause, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988), which allows a court to set aside agen-
cy action that is "not in accordance with law." Whichever view one takes, Shapiro and
Levy need to take account of the doctrine somewhere.
63. It is conceivable that Shapiro and Levy would regard the agency's past position
as "an important aspect of the problem," which the.agency must "consider" under their
subsection (D)(2). Elsewhere, however, they seem to contemplate that the latter language
would implicate only statutory issues. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1073 (citing
Levin, Restatement Report, supra note 12, at 250-53). They probably must endorse some
such limitation. As the cited section of the restatement report explains, a standard of
review that would permit judges to insist that agencies discuss every issue that they per-
sonally regard as "important," without regard "to whether those issues are anchored in the
statute, would authorize precisely the kind of open-ended, "outcome-oriented" review that
Shapiro and Levy are trying to prevent. See also Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. LTV
Corp4 496 U.S. 633, 646-47 (1990) (holding that an agency is not required to consider
the policies embedded in statutes other than the one it is enforcing-from which it would
seem to follow, a fortiori, that the agency is also not required to consider policies that
are embedded in no statute at all).
64. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29,
51 (1983) ("We hold only that given the judgment made in 1977 that airbags are an
effective and cost-beneficial lifesaving technology, the mandatory passive restraint rule
may not be abandoned without any consideration whatsoever of an airbags-only require-
ment."); id. at 41-42, 57 (explaining need for reasoned analysis when an agency changes
its course).
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even if the court thinks those perceptions are dead wrong. It is
hard to believe that the authors would go so far as to abolish a
variety of rationality review that (at least in its "substantial evi-
dence" mode, which Shapiro and Levy intend to subsume within
this subsection) has been part of judicial review of administrative
action almost from its beginnings.
What would they do, for example, with a case like Bowen v.
American Hospital Ass'n?' In this case, the Secretary of Health
and Human Services imposed measures designed to prevent hospi-
tals from discriminating against handicapped newborn infants. In
the Supreme Court, the government conceded that a hospital poli-
cy that makes treatment decisions based on parental wishes is not
discriminatory, because it places the handicapped and nonhandi-
capped on the same footing. Even so, the government argued that
"regardless of its 'magnitude,' there [was] sufficient evidence of
'illegality' to justify 'establishing basic mechanisms to allow for
effective enforcement of a clearly applicable statute.' "" That was
certainly a "logically coherent" explanation: what made it untena-
ble and the regulation invalid, according to a plurality of the Su-
preme Court, was that the government could not point to a single
instance in which a hospital had refused treatment in the absence
of parental consent.67
At least as a matter of logic, such an analysis does not re-
quire the reviewing court to take a stand on the "ultimate policy
issue"; it only requires the court to consider the strength of the
evidence. Shapiro and Levy may contend that to accord judges this
prerogative poses too great a risk of judicial "outcome orienta-
tion," but perhaps removing this sort of check on agencies gives
them too much power to take action without bothering to find out
if their perceptions of the world conform to reality.' The curtail-
ment of judicial review of the strength of the evidence seems
especially questionable as applied to agency adjudications. If an
65. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
66. Id. at 633 (plurality opinion) (quoting 49 Fed. Reg. 1645 (1984)).
67. Id. at 633-36.
68. See International Union, UAW v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665, 669 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
("The requirement of supportive evidence operates to assure a link between the agency's
substantive mandate and the real-world circumstances in which the agency operates. If an
agency could claim to be applying a statutory constraint merely by asserting the existence
of some fact . . . it would be free to defeat the underlying purpose of the constitutional
limits on delegation ....").
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agency imposes a sanction on an individual who claims to be total-
ly innocent, most of us would think that a court ought to consider
not only whether the agency has given a "coherent" explanation of
its view of the evidence, but also whether the evidence would in
fact reasonably support the charge.69
If I have taxed the reader's patience with too much detail in
this Part, I did so to illustrate the difficulty of drafting scope of
review standards that are both clear and compatible with the func-
tions that we want judicial review to serve. Perhaps others could
make similar points about the ABA restatement; I intend no ad-
verse comparison here. Readers may examine both sets of stan-
dards and take their pick. This review of some of the potential
problems in Shapiro and Levy's draft statute should serve, howev-
er, to underscore my earlier comments about the limits of what we
can expect from scope formulas (whether codified or otherwise).
Given the inherent complexities of the subject matter, perhaps the
Court is wise to avoid moving too quickly to attempt to settle the
law.
III. CONCLUSION: THE ROLE OF SCHOLARSHIP
In this comment, I have accepted the thrust of Shapiro and
Levy's descriptive claim: that the institutional characteristics of the
courts tend to impede them from articulating and conforming to
durable, consistent scope of review principles. Unlike the authors,
however, I am skeptical about the extent to which one should de-
mand orderliness and analytical clarity of doctrine. At times courts
have legitimate reasons for wanting to keep their options open, in-
cluding their responsibility for maintaining the coherence of the
substantive law.
Indeed, a body of judicial review doctrine that would tie
judges' hands so tightly as to lead to determinacy of result might
be neither achievable nor satisfying. Efforts to induce judges to
69. I may be mistaken in supposing that Shapiro and Levy mean to eliminate this
sort of review. After all, they profess to be codifying the four-factor State Farm formula
for abuse of discretion review, which did endorse judicial consideration of the strength of
the evidence. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S.
29, 43 (1983) (stating that a rule is arbitrary if agency "offered an explanation for its
decision that runs counter to the evidence before the agency"). But if they do contem-
plate retaining this element of judicial review, I fail to see how they can claim to be
improving the clarity of section 706.
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approach broad classes of problems using a consistent method ofanalysis are generally likely to be more fruitful, but even that
objective should be tempered by a recognition that the problems
in this area are elusive. My critiques of Shapiro and Levy's model
statute are intended to emphasize how easily efforts to achieve
predictability can drift towards oversimplification.
Notwithstanding these cautionary remarks, which were inspired
by Shapiro and Levy's resolute emphasis on achieving "determina-
cy," I certainly sympathize with their wish that judicial review
doctrine should be clearer than it is. But how can clarification
become a reality, given the institutional forces that constrain the
courts as well as (at least in my estimation) the Congress?
Though it sounds pretentious, I suggest that an unusually large
share of the burden has to fall on the scholarly community. Trea-
tises and articles that attempt to describe and evaluate the overall
patterns are a necessary corrective to the largely unavoidable in-
consistencies of the judicial literature. Our credibility in these cir-
cumstances comes not from our superior wisdom, but simply from
our opportunity to think about these issues in ways that judges
often cannot or will not when they are preoccupied with resolving
a substantive question and assembling a majority in a single case. I
sometimes compare scope of review doctrine to a mosaic design
that can only be appreciated when observed from several paces
away. In similar fashion, scholarly distance, which is so often an
impediment to understanding, can also facilitate insight in this
particular setting.
Of course, the Supreme Court has final responsibility for the
shape of federal law, and when it takes a firm stand, the commen-
tators, like the lower courts, must take the Court's position seri-
ously. But when we observe that the Court's actions speak more
loudly than its words, we can at least report this fact and distin-
guish the situation from others in which the Court acts as though
it means what it says. And when formulas spoken in one context
work out awkwardly in another, we can explain why that is so.
Any effort to devise a rational division of labor between the judi-
ciary and the academy should take account of these possibilities.
This claim of authority for scholarship will only make sense,
however, if commentators are willing to read enough cases to give
their generalizations credibility and to be appropriately skeptical
when the judiciary's actual behavior does not seem to jibe with its
declared intentions. Analyzing a few "leading" cases in a vacuum,
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as too many articles in this area do, is no substitute for looking to
see what is actually going on in the caselaw as a whole.
For several reasons, it is not easy to do the sort of research
that I am urging. The caselaw is almost limitless-after all, vir-
tually every administrative case that courts decide on the merits
can be said to contain a scope of review issue. Standard key num-
bers do not necessarily retrieve all the relevant cases. Moreover,
scope of review research demands that the investigator read opin-
ions closely to see how the court actually arrived at its re-
sult-which may not be the same as the kind of reasoning the
court said it would apply in the portion of its opinion labeled
"Standard of Review." 70
But this warning serves only to remind us of Justice Scalia's
wry advice in the pages of this journal a few years ago: "Adminis-
trative law is not for sissies. '" 7' The proof that Shapiro and Levy
are no sissies is that they have had the nerve to offer their model
for judicial review in a public forum-particularly with critics like
myself on hand to raise questions about it. Now one hopes that
others will follow their lead, recognizing both the difficulty of the
material and the exceptional need for scholarly work in this chal-
lenging area.
70. These comments are not intended to dismiss out of hand the sort of computer-
assisted research into caselaw that Shapiro and Levy, among other scholars, have put to
use. See Shapiro & Levy, supra note 1, at 1065 nn.62, 64. See generally Peter H. Schuck
& E. Donald Elliott, Studying Administrative Law: A Methodology for, and Report on,
New Empirical Research, 42 ADMIN. L. REV. 519 (1990) (exploring methodological is-
sues). No doubt the utility of this technique varies with the precise question being inves-
tigated.
71. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DUKE LJ. 511, 511.
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